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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 10-2338 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MAURICE OUTEN, 
 
     Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1-09-cr-00170-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable William W. Caldwell 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 11, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL, AMBRO and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 25, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Maurice Outen was convicted of possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or 
more of a substance that contains cocaine base.  On appeal, he claims that his trial 
 2 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective and that the verdict was against the weight of the 
evidence.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm. 
I. 
 We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
 On May 14, 2009, officers with the Swatara Township Police Department were 
approached by Emrica Smalls in a hotel parking lot near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.  
Smalls asked the officers for their help in retrieving clothes left in a hotel room rented by 
Outen, her former boyfriend.  Smalls told the officers that Outen was trafficking drugs 
from the room.  Outen refused the officers’ request to accompany Smalls to retrieve her 
things and suggested that a hotel employee would go to the room instead.  While Outen 
and the employee were in his room, one of the officers saw two handheld mixers, plastic 
baggies, acetone, and a box for a digital scale inside a trashcan outside Outen’s room.  
Smalls remained in the parking lot and informed the officers that Outen was using his 
rental car to transport drugs.  When they approached the car, officers observed a clear 
plastic bag containing a white powder sticking out from underneath a floor mat.  Outen 
came back out to the parking lot, and the officers arrested him.  Smalls also told the 
officers that Outen was hiding cocaine in the ceiling of the hotel’s gym.  As Smalls 
predicted, officers found underneath the ceiling tiles a bag containing a scale, powder 
cocaine, crack cocaine, and a receipt for Outen’s hotel room.  After obtaining a search 
 3 
warrant for Outen’s hotel room and rental car, officers discovered cocaine and various 
drug paraphernalia. 
 Outen was indicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania for possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of a substance 
that contains cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).
1
  
The government presented testimony from the officers describing what they found in 
Outen’s hotel room, rental car, and in the gym.  A jury convicted Outen and the District 
Court sentenced Outen to 136 months’ imprisonment.  He timely appealed. 
II. 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  Outen 
advances two claims on appeal, namely, that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to properly articulate the theory that Smalls planted the evidence against him and 
(2) the conviction is against the weight of the evidence.  We address each in turn. 
 Outen argues that his trial counsel failed to assert to the jury that Smalls had 
motive and opportunity to plant the incriminating evidence.  We decline to address the 
merits of Outen’s claim on direct appeal because “it has long been the practice of this 
court to defer the issue of ineffectiveness of trial counsel to a collateral attack.”  United 
States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 215 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Thornton, 327 
F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2003)).  We depart from that practice “[w]here the record is 
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sufficient to allow determination of ineffective assistance of counsel[.]”  United States v. 
Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991).  The record here is not complete enough 
for us to make a determination as to Outen’s ineffective assistance claim.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Olfano, 503 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2007).  Accordingly, we must decline 
to reach the issue at this juncture.
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 As to Outen’s second argument, he asserts that the conviction was against the 
weight of the evidence and that there was insufficient evidence to support a guilty 
verdict.  Outen confuses a challenge to the weight of the evidence with a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  The concepts are distinct.  See United States v. Silveus, 542 
F.3d 993, 1004-05 (3d Cir. 2008).  The proper manner to argue that the verdict was 
against the weight of the evidence is through a motion for a new trial.  Outen did not file 
such a motion.  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 provides that “[o]n a defendant’s 
motion, the court may grant a new trial to that defendant if the interests of justice so 
require.”  “Under this rule, a judge has no power to order a new trial on his own motion” 
because “[a] judge can act only in response to a motion timely made by a defendant.”  
United States v. Wright, 363 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted).  Because Outen never moved for a new trial in the District Court 
under a Rule 33 motion, we will not address his weight claim here. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
1
 28 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) was amended pursuant to the Fair Sentencing Act 
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, effective August 3, 2010, to replace fifty grams with 280 
grams of a mixture or substance that contains cocaine base. 
 
2
 Of course, this disposition does not preclude Outen from pursuing his ineffective 
assistance claim in a collateral proceeding. 
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 Insofar as Outen attempts to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, “we must 
sustain the verdict if a rational trier of fact could have found [the] defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the verdict is supported by substantial evidence.”  United 
States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 2007).  We will review for plain error 
because Outen did not raise this claim before the District Court.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 
52(b); United States v. Thayer, 201 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 1999).  “A conviction based on 
insufficient evidence is plain error only if the verdict constitutes a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice.”  Thayer, 201 F.3d at 219.  The government had to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Outen knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine or crack 
cocaine with the intent to distribute.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the government, see McKee, 506 F.3d at 232, we determine that substantial evidence 
supports the conviction.  The government introduced a plethora of evidence of Outen’s 
drug trafficking, including cocaine wrapped in Outen’s hotel room receipt and various 
drug paraphernalia found in his room, rental car, and the hotel gym.  Although Outen 
claims that Smalls planted the evidence against him, there is ample evidence to support 
the jury’s finding.  See id. at 233.  We cannot say it was plain error for the jury to have 
convicted him. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment and sentence of the District 
Court. 
